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Corporate Governance and Social Welfare in 
the Common-Law World 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER.  By Christopher M. Bruner.  
New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.  309 pages.  
$110.00. 
Reviewed by David A. Skeel, Jr.* 
Introduction 
Sometime around 1990, American corporate governance scholars 
discovered that corporate law and corporate governance do not work the 
same way everywhere in the world.  This was not the first time American 
corporate governance scholars had made such a discovery.  Comparative 
corporate governance scholarship flourished for a few years in the 1970s, 
and earlier generations had done their own comparative spadework.1  But 
the new wave of scholarship is not shaped in discernible ways by its 
predecessors and has brought new tools and perspectives to bear. 
Many of the articles at the beginning of this wave used the 
comparisons primarily to shed light on American corporate governance, 
often to demonstrate that features of American governance are not 
inevitable.  Perhaps most prominently, Mark Roe contrasted governance 
patterns in Germany and Japan in connection with his political theory of 
American corporate governance.2  In Roe’s account, the separation between 
ownership and control in America’s “Berle–Means” corporations was not 
simply caused by economic imperatives, as corporate law scholars often 
 
 * S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I 
am grateful to John Armour, Brian Cheffins, David Garland, Jennifer Hill, Dionysia Katelouzou, 
and Mark Roe for helpful comments and conversations, and to the editors of the Texas Law 
Review for inviting me to write this Review. 
1. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 378 (1996) (noting that in the 1970s American legal scholars 
compared the German approach to legal and institutional arrangements in corporate governance, 
including the two-tier board and codetermination). 
2. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 10, 59–61 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Theory] (comparing bank involvement in 
German and Japanese firms with bank involvement in the United States); Mark J. Roe, Some 
Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 
1927, 1929 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, Corporate Structure] (explaining that differences between the 
corporate governance structures of Germany and Japan on the one hand and the United States on 
the other can be explained by an economic model that takes into account political histories, 
cultures, and paths of economic development). 
SKEEL.FINAL.OC (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2014  12:11 PM 
974 Texas Law Review [Vol. 92:973 
tended to assume.3  Politics also played a starring role, with populist 
pressures first forcing the fragmentation of American financial channels in 
the nineteenth century and then forcing the fragmentation of American 
corporate ownership at key junctures when institutions had begun to acquire 
major stakes in American corporations.4  But were outcomes other than the 
American one possible?  Germany and Japan offered a startling contrast.  In 
each country, banks held or controlled major stakes in the nation’s largest 
corporations and exerted much more direct influence over corporate 
governance.5 
A few years later, additional theories of comparative corporate 
governance began to emerge, some challenging Roe’s political theory, or at 
least providing additional explanations for the American outcome.  In a 
series of much-criticized and highly influential empirical articles, 
economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 
and Robert Vishny identified a variety of factors which, they argued, shape 
the quality of a nation’s corporate governance.6  Among other things, 
countries that protect minority shareholders are likely to see more diffuse 
ownership than those that do not7 and countries with common law origins 
fare better than their civil law counterparts.8  Turning his sight more fully to 
Europe, Roe offered an alternative account of corporate governance 
differences, one not tied to legal origin.  In Roe’s account, corporations in 
countries with social democracies tend to have more stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance, with greater solicitude for employees, whereas 
countries that lack long-term social democratic control are more 
shareholder oriented.9  Operationally, when labor was able to make strong 
claims on large firms’ cash flow, as he said was common in the post-World 
War II decades, concentrated ownership with blockholders and controlling 
shareholders was more likely to preserve value for shareholders than diffuse 
ownership and managerial-centered firms.10  In a similar vein, more recent 
 
3. Roe, Political Theory, supra note 2, at 10; Roe, Corporate Structure, supra note 2. 
4. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 39–42 (1994).  These political determinants are a central theme 
of Roe’s influential book.  See id. at xiv–xv. 
5. Id. at 186. 
6. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. 
ECON. 3, 24 (2000) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Investor Protection] (“[S]trong investor protection 
is associated with effective corporate governance . . . .”); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1132 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal 
Determinants] (listing the origin of a country’s laws, its investor protections, and quality of law 
enforcement as influencing a country’s external finance). 
7. Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. 
FIN. 1, 4 (2000). 
8. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 6, at 1137, 1149. 
9. See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 29–37 
(2003). 
10. See id. at 17, 199. 
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work on varieties of capitalism contrasts liberal market economies, on the 
one hand, with coordinated markets on the other.11 
These comprehensive theories tend to draw a sharp distinction between 
corporate governance in the United States and United Kingdom as 
compared to governance elsewhere in Europe and Japan.12  The distinction 
is sensible, given that U.S. and U.K. corporations do not seem to have 
controlling shareholders,13 governance in the two countries is more 
shareholder oriented than governance elsewhere in the world,14 and the 
nations share a common history.15  
But a strange thing happens if, after conducting these comparisons at 
30,000 feet, we make our way down to the actual details of U.S. and U.K. 
corporate governance: at close range, they do not look so similar at all.16  In 
the United Kingdom, shareholders can call a shareholders’ meeting and 
displace the directors, or effect a major change, in any corporation at any 
time.17  In the United States, by contrast, shareholders cannot replace the 
directors of a firm that has an effective staggered board without cause, and 
they cannot initiate fundamental changes on their own.18  Similarly, if a 
hostile bidder makes an offer to the shareholders of a U.K. firm, the board 
of directors cannot interfere with the bid,19 as the directors of Manchester 
United20 and, more recently, Cadbury’s are (from their perspective, at least) 
all-too-well aware.21  In the United States, by contrast, target directors have 
considerable flexibility to fend off unwanted suitors.22  What are we to 
make of these very significant differences, which suggest that U.K. 
 
11. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Introduction to VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 8 (Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice eds., 2001). 
12. See Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A 
Comparative Analysis of the UK and the US, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 147, 147 (2006) (noting the 
tendency in scholarship to separate Anglo-American forms of corporate governance from 
Continental European and Japanese forms). 
13. ROE, supra note 9, at 16; see also La Porta et al., supra note 7, at 3 (stating that in the 
United States and United Kingdom, large firms are generally controlled by managers). 
14. See Aguilera et al., supra note 12. 
15. John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure 
and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 
1715 (2002). 
16. Each of the distinctions noted in this paragraph is described in detail in the book under 
review, CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: 
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013). 
17. Id. at 29. 
18. Id. at 39. 
19. Id. at 33. 
20. Jere Longman, American Not Welcome in Manchester, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/26/sports/soccer/26united.html?pagewanted=print&position=. 
21. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 253–56. 
22. Id. at 41. 
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governance is more truly shareholder oriented, whereas the United States 
protects managerial discretion? 
One response to this kind of puzzle is to tease out the distinctive 
features of each system without attempting to reconcile them.  
Alternatively, one might simply chalk up the differences to the 
idiosyncracies of the United Kingdom, which confounds nearly every 
general account of corporate governance.23  Another response is to take an 
opposite tack.  Rather than emphasizing the unique features of each system, 
as contextualists might, functionalist accounts often resolve tensions at a 
high level of generality.  The preeminent functionalist account of corporate 
law, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, identifies three agency cost 
problems—conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, and conflicts 
between shareholders and creditors and other third parties—as the central 
concern of corporate governance in every developed nation.24  From this 
perspective, the United States and United Kingdom (like the other 
developed countries considered by The Anatomy of Corporate Law25) are 
addressing the same problems in similar, but not identical, ways. 
Like La Porta et al. and Roe, Christopher Bruner seeks in Corporate 
Governance in the Common-Law World to claim a middle ground by 
identifying a key feature—an independent variable or variables, as an 
empirical scholar might say—that explains enough of the differences to be 
worth highlighting—as did political economy for Roe and legal origin for 
La Porta et al.  For Bruner, differences between the United States and 
United Kingdom that confound other governance theories can be 
understood by focusing on a new variable, each nation’s social welfare 
system.26  If a country has a robust social welfare system, he argues, 
corporate law can and will focus more narrowly and more strongly on the 
interests of shareholders.27  If the country’s social welfare system is weak, 
by contrast, corporate governance is likely to fill in the gaps by inviting 
managers to take the concerns of employees into account rather than 
attending solely to the shareholders’ interest.28  This explains why corporate 
governance is so shareholder oriented in the United Kingdom, which has 
universal healthcare and generous unemployment benefits,29 while 
shareholders’ powers are more attenuated in the United States, with its 
 
23. For discussion of the difficulties of fitting the United Kingdom within current theories of 
comparative corporate governance, see Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 15, 1714–20. 
24. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 36 (2d ed. 2009). 
25. Id. at 3. 
26. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 4. 
27. Id. at 4–5. 
28. See id. at 5. 
29. See id. at 145, 169. 
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much weaker social welfare protections.30  Turning to the two other major 
common law countries, Australia and Canada, Bruner concludes that they 
fall in between but are more similar to the United Kingdom in their welfare 
protections and shareholder orientation.31 
Bruner’s social welfare account of corporate governance is a partial 
theory rather than a theory of everything.  The thesis applies only to 
countries whose corporations tend to have dispersed ownership and does 
not speak to the many countries whose corporations tend to have a 
controlling shareholder or shareholders.32  It suggests, in a sense, that Roe’s 
social democracy insights invert when stock ownership is dispersed, with 
robust social welfare protections traveling together with highly-shareholder-
oriented governance.33  Or it at least qualifies Roe’s argument that labor’s 
capacity to make strong claims on a firm’s cash flow is complementary 
with concentrated ownership.  Unlike Roe, Bruner has a refined sense of 
social democracy: a social democracy that has powerful labor inside the 
firm might lead to concentrated ownership, but a social democracy that has 
government satisfy the social democratic demands outside the firm will lead 
to fewer social democratic demands inside the firm and, hence, will open up 
political and social space for a more intense shareholder orientation of the 
firm.  Britain fits this latter case, Bruner argues.34 
After describing Bruner’s theory and evidence in more detail in the 
first Part of this Review, I poke at it from several angles in the two Parts 
that follow.  In Part II, I consider whether there is a mechanism that 
adequately explains the connection between social welfare and shareholder 
orientation; interestingly, despite the book’s title, Bruner does not suggest 
that the common law plays any particular role.35  In Part III, I consider 
whether shareholders in the United States may have more power than their 
limited formal rights suggest, and in Part IV I ask whether the United States 
(rather than the United Kingdom, as is conventionally assumed) may simply 
be an outlier, due in large part to federalism and as reflected by the United 
States’ weak social welfare system.  I then conclude. 
Although I will be playing devil’s advocate throughout this Review, 
Bruner’s insights are a revelation.  As I emphasize by way of conclusion, he 
has identified a critical, new dimension of our understanding of corporate 
law. 
 
30. See id. at 166–69. 
31. Id. at 176, 200. 
32. Id. at 3–4. 
33. Id. at 120–23. 
34. See id. at 143–66. 
35. See id. at 117–19 (critiquing arguments suggesting that relative levels of shareholder-
centrism depend on the systems of law of particular countries). 
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I. Corporate Governance and Social Welfare: The Central Thesis 
Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World is no mystery 
story.  Bruner states his thesis about shareholder-centeredness and social 
welfare at the outset then avers to it repeatedly throughout the book.  He 
writes:  
My core claim is that greater regard for the interests of employees in 
other regulatory domains has tended to insulate certain corporate 
governance systems from political pressure to show regard for 
employees and other “stakeholders,” permitting more exclusive 
focus on shareholders without precipitating backlash – a key political 
determinant of the relatively higher degree of shareholder-centrism 
exhibited in Australia and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser (but 
nevertheless substantial) degree in Canada as well.36   
In the United States, by contrast:  
[W]eaker regard for the interests of employees in other regulatory 
domains has tended to result in greater political pressure being 
brought to bear on corporate governance to do so, inhibiting 
exclusive focus on shareholders – a key political determinant of the 
relatively lower degree of shareholder-centrism exhibited in the 
United States.37 
Bruner’s claim—that the robustness of these four countries’ social 
welfare systems determines how shareholder-centered the corporate 
governance of each is (and thus that “the political foundations of 
shareholder power effectively lie outside corporate law itself”38)—is 
elegant, though substantiating it is inevitably more of a slog.  In the first of 
the two heftiest chapters of the book, Bruner outlines the extent of 
shareholder-centeredness of the corporate governance in each of his four 
countries.39  Bruner begins by describing the shareholder-centric features of 
U.K. governance and the limits on U.S. shareholder influence—including 
directors’ ability to defend against takeovers and the shareholders’ inability 
to adopt bylaws that constrain directors’ discretion.40  Australian corporate 
governance is more shareholder oriented than the United States, as 
evidenced by the outcry that attended the decision by Rupert Murdoch to 
move the incorporation of his News Corp. empire from Australia to the 
United States.41  Canada is a more complicated case.  Although its securities 
 
36. Id. at 22–23. 
37. Id. at 23. 
38. Id. at 27. 
39. See id. at 28–107. 
40. Id. at 29–65. 
41. Id. at 71–73.  Bruner’s discussion of News Corp. draws extensively from a careful study 
by Jennifer Hill.  Id. (citing Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News 
Corp.’s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2010)). 
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and takeover law, which is regulated by the provinces, is quite 
proshareholder, Canada’s corporate law makes important reference to the 
interests of other constituencies.42  Based in part on an analysis of the high-
profile BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders43 case, Bruner concludes that its 
effect is more shareholder oriented than the law on the books seems to 
suggest.44  Here and elsewhere in the book, Bruner illustrates the 
comparisons with helpful charts highlighting the salient corporate 
governance features of the four countries.45 
In the book’s other major chapter, Bruner conducts a similar exercise 
with social welfare, while keeping the parallel history of corporate 
governance in each country continuously in view.46  Although the United 
Kingdom first began to construct its social welfare system in the early 
twentieth century, its full flourishing came after World War II, which 
brought universal healthcare and substantial unemployment benefits.47  In 
the United States, by contrast, social welfare benefits come primarily 
through an employee’s corporate employer, and healthcare coverage is 
much more spotty.48  The contrast is reflected in labor’s different response 
to the rise of takeovers in the two countries.  After initially opposing 
shareholder-friendly takeover rules, British labor accepted them in the 
1960s,49 whereas American labor continued to call for limits on takeovers.50  
Australia is in some respects the most interesting case study because its 
stance on takeovers shifted.  After initially seeming to permit directors to 
defend against takeovers, Australia adopted the U.K. shareholder-centric 
approach in the early 2000s.51  Bruner argues that the shift was made 
possible by Australia’s expansive, new, social welfare framework put in 
place between the 1970s and 1990s.52 
In the book’s final chapter, Bruner begins by contrasting the dispersed 
shareholder regimes of the four countries under discussion with the 
concentrated share ownership in countries like Germany.53  “[I]n a country 
where blockholding predominates,” he writes, “the principal regulatory 
issue remains how to counteract the blockholders’ innate power over 
 
42. Id. at 77–78, 84–89. 
43. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.). 
44. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 89–92. 
45. See, e.g., id. at 53, 68, 78, 83. 
46. Id. at 143–220. 
47. See id. at 145–47. 
48. Id. at 167–71. 
49. Id. at 153. 
50. See id. at 166–67 (describing how U.S. corporate law favored promanagement takeover 
rules through the 1980s). 
51. Id. at 192–93. 
52. See id. 
53. Id. at 223, 225–29. 
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corporate affairs through various forms of stakeholder-oriented 
protections.”54  The interests of shareholders are secondary.  Bruner also 
considers three countries that might seem to confound his theory: China, 
Japan, and the Netherlands.55  In each of these countries, blockholder share 
ownership is even lower than in the United Kingdom or United States, he 
notes, “yet these countries have not historically exhibited the forms of 
shareholder orientation that I associate with a high degree of ownership 
dispersal.”56  In China, the government has effective control over most large 
corporations, and in the Netherlands shareholder influence is stymied by a 
standard trust arrangement that holds voting control of the corporation.57  In 
Japan, crossholdings by lenders traditionally neutralized the influence of 
ordinary shareholders, although they now appear to be breaking down.58  
Bruner speculates that “deeply entrenched historical, cultural, and political 
commitments” pull China, the Netherlands, and Japan toward effective 
concentrated ownership, whereas a different set of historical, cultural, and 
political commitments tug Australia and Canada in the opposite direction.59  
In the second half of the chapter, Bruner considers shifting shareholder 
patterns in the United Kingdom and postcrisis developments in the United 
Kingdom and United States, which he describes, drawing on a framework 
developed by Peter Gourevich,60 in terms of shifting coalitions among 
shareholders, managers, and employees.61  The United Kingdom has seen 
increasing shareholder power, while employees’ power and welfare 
protections have declined,62 whereas shareholder and employee power have 
both increased in the United States, thanks to a handful of shareholder-
centered provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act and the enactment of healthcare 
legislation.63 
Along the way, Bruner manages to work in succinct discussions of 
each of the major corporate governance debates in the American scholarly 
literature.  In addition to a chapter critiquing each of the main comparative 
 
54. Id. at 228. 
55. Id. at 229–36. 
56. Id. at 229. 
57. Id. at 230–32. 
58. Id. at 233. 
59. Id. at 236. 
60. See id. at 131 (locating the notion of shifting coalitions of stakeholders in a prior 
Gourevich work). 
61. Id. at 242–86. 
62. See id. at 286 (noting that “the postcrisis response[] of the United Kingdom” has 
“strengthened shareholders yet weakened protections for stakeholders”). 
63. See id. at 280–81, 283–84, 286 (explaining that postcrisis reform efforts in the United 
States “have tended to promote both shareholder-centric corporate governance and greater social 
welfare protection for working families” and referencing both the Dodd-Frank Act and health 
insurance reforms as specific examples of these efforts).  For an earlier argument about the 
increasing influence of shareholders, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 
TEXAS L. REV. 987 (2010). 
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corporate governance theories currently on offer,64 Bruner discusses the 
debate over Delaware’s status as the leading state of incorporation65 and the 
limitations of the passivity thesis of corporate takeovers,66 as well as the 
Platonic guardian,67 team production,68 and shareholder primacy theories of 
the proper role of directors.69  For anyone who is interested in sampling the 
concerns of recent corporate governance scholarship, Corporate 
Governance in the Common-Law World is a helpful primer. 
Given the book’s title, one surprise is that the common law tradition 
plays no direct role in Bruner’s thesis.  Bruner does speculate that ongoing 
and historical ties among the four countries may help to explain why all 
have wound up on the dispersed-ownership side of the governance map and 
that pulls toward the United States or United Kingdom may shape 
Australian and Canadian governance.  But unlike with La Porta et al., who 
argue that the nature of the common law process has had a formative 
influence on the corporate governance of common law nations,70 the 
common law does not figure in Bruner’s theory.  In fact, Bruner’s theory 
posits that factors other than the common law—the nature of social welfare 
policy and its implementation—are more powerful determinants of 
shareholder orientation than legal origin.  In this sense, his social welfare-
based theory can be seen as implicitly rejecting claims that the common law 
is a key determinant of corporate governance. 
To my knowledge, almost the only other recent work arguing that 
employee-oriented legislation outside of corporate law is essential to 
understanding the contours of American corporate governance is an 
 
64. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 111–42. 
65. Id. at 276–77. 
66. See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 16, at 55 (discussing Easterbrook and Fischel, who suggest 
that weak shareholder rights are acceptable “because management can be sufficiently disciplined 
through the market for corporate control, which depends critically on free capacity to accept 
hostile tender offers”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (1981) 
(proffering the passivity thesis that “managers of target companies should acquiesce when 
confronted with a tender offer”). 
67. See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 16, at 55; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550–51 (2003) 
(explaining that under the Platonic guardian theory, corporate boards of directors are not “mere 
agent[s]” of shareholders but are “sui generis” bodies “serving as the nexus for the various 
contracts comprising” a corporation). 
68. See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 16, at 57–59; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, 
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999) (indicating that 
team production problems “arise in situations where a productive activity requires the combined 
investment and coordinated effort of two or more individuals or groups”). 
69. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 60–64. 
70. See La Porta et al., Investor Protection, supra note 6, at 8–9 (explaining that “[c]ommon 
law countries have the strongest protection of outside investors” for various reasons). 
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insightful article by Adam Winkler.71  Responding to laments by advocates 
of stakeholder governance that American corporate governance is too 
shareholder oriented, Winkler pointed out that corporations are subject to a 
wide range of noncorporate regulations that have stakeholders in mind.72  
The employment laws regulate collective bargaining and provide 
protections for employees, for instance, and the environmental laws impel 
firms to take the environment into account.73  If we expand our frame of 
reference beyond corporate law, Winkler argues, the overall system is quite 
stakeholder oriented.74 
Bruner’s theory can, in a sense, be seen as a dynamic account of some 
of the same noncorporate laws that Winkler drew attention to.  Bruner 
suggests not only that we need to include noncorporate law in our thinking 
about corporate governance but that there is a feedback effect between two 
key areas of regulation: corporate governance and the social welfare 
system. 
II. What Is the Mechanism? 
Any theory that makes causal claims about regulatory evolution must 
be prepared to address two questions.  The first is whether the connections 
that the scholar asserts are real.  For Bruner’s theory, the question is 
whether shareholder orientation does indeed vary with the scope of a 
country’s social welfare system.  Second, if the relationship is real, the 
scholar must also marshal evidence that the connection is causal rather than 
simply a potentially unexplained correlation—here, that some mechanism 
links an increase or decrease in shareholder orientation with the robustness 
of a country’s social welfare system. 
On the first issue, whether the relationship between social welfare and 
shareholder orientation genuinely does exist, Bruner assembles an 
impressive amount of evidence.  Not surprisingly, given that Bruner is a 
corporate law scholar, the evidence tilts toward the corporate side of the 
equation.  But he gives an impressive survey of the emergence of a robust 
social welfare system in the United Kingdom and the absence of 
comparable protections in the United States, which has less unemployment 
protection and, until recently, lacked a national healthcare system.75  The 
 
71. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate 
Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2004). 
72. See id. at 111 (expounding that “progressive principles of stakeholder protection” that are 
“outside of corporate law” are “powerful forces shaping the choices available to corporate 
management concerning basic operational and organizational decisions”). 
73. See id. (observing that corporate decisions “are made under the mandatory legal rules 
embodied in employment and labor law, workplace safety law, environmental law, consumer 
protection law, and pension law”). 
74. Id. 
75. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
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story in Australia and Canada is more complicated and less stark, but 
generally consistent.  Overall, the connections seem to be real. 
A few nagging doubts remain.  Several of the most important 
shareholder-empowering U.K. rules predate the post-World War II 
expansion of the United Kingdom’s social welfare system.76  The principal 
development in the past generation was the United Kingdom’s adoption of a 
similarly shareholder-oriented stance toward hostile takeovers starting in 
the 1960s.77  These doubts suggest that the relationship between social 
welfare and shareholder orientation is not pristine, but overall Bruner’s case 
seems strong. 
The second issue—the claim that there is a causal relationship between 
social welfare and corporate governance—is much trickier.  If social 
welfare and shareholder orientation are related, as Bruner claims, we ideally 
would want to see a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the two.  
Perhaps after the implementation of strong employee protections we would 
see a sudden shift in the shareholder orientation of corporate law or perhaps 
even a direct bargain: in return for strong unemployment benefits, labor 
leaders agree to strong, shareholder-oriented corporate law reforms.  Or, in 
return for a weakening of collective bargaining protections, investor 
interests might drop their objections to reforms that would weaken the 
powers of shareholders in corporate law.  Alternatively, the weakening of 
collective bargaining protections might prompt a backlash against 
shareholder-centric corporate law rules.78  How does Bruner fare in 
providing this kind of evidence? 
In some respects, surprisingly well, especially with the United 
Kingdom.  In the United Kingdom, the highly proshareholder takeover rules 
emerged under the Labour government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson.79  
Labour’s embrace of proshareholder rules followed both an initial period of 
opposition and a steady strengthening of the United Kingdom’s social 
welfare system.80  Bruner points out, for instance, that “the Redundancy 
Payments Act of 1965,” which significantly enhanced unemployment 
 
76. Arguably more consistent with Bruner’s thesis, U.K. governance does not appear to have 
been especially shareholder oriented (at least in practice) early in the twentieth century.  See, e.g., 
BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 
33–40 (2008) (claiming that a shareholder’s right to call meetings was established in 1900 but a 
right to remove directors was not available until 1948). 
77. This history is recounted in John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for 
Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 
95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1756–64 (2007). 
78. At several points in the book, Bruner suggests that the possibility of backlash may play a 
causal role in the patterns he detects.  See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 16, at 22–23 (describing 
“backlash” as a key component of the “relatively higher degree of shareholder-centrism exhibited 
in Australia and the United Kingdom”). 
79. Id. at 151, 160. 
80. See id. at 147–49. 
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benefits, “predates by three years the Labour government’s reinforcement 
of an extremely shareholder-centric takeover regime through the creation of 
the City Code and the City Panel.”81  Although Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher sought to cut back on welfare protections, the combination of 
fulsome social welfare protections and strong shareholder protections 
endured;82 Bruner quotes a recent study finding that “U.K. welfare 
expenditures remained ‘remarkably stable’ between 1973 and 1996.”83 
Bruner’s survey of developments in Australia is similarly suggestive.  
When takeovers first emerged, Australia experimented with a U.S.-style 
approach, which gave the directors of a target corporation discretion to 
defend against takeovers under some circumstances.84  But in the early 
2000s, Australia shifted direction, creating a Takeover Panel modeled on 
the United Kingdom and forbidding takeover defenses.85  The shift, in 
Bruner’s telling, came after the Labour government had put in place a full 
panoply of welfare protections over a twenty-year period.86  I will leave it to 
others to assess whether Bruner’s historical description is accurate,87 but it 
appears to nicely support his core thesis about social welfare and 
shareholder orientation. 
With Canada, however, the story muddies considerably.  Canada has 
far more extensive social welfare protections than the United States,88 
which suggests that its corporate governance should be more shareholder-
oriented.  On its face, however, Canadian corporate law seems to protect 
stakeholders as well as shareholders.89  This suggests that Canada may 
combine social welfare protections and stakeholder governance, a 
combination that should not be sustainable if Bruner’s theory is correct.  
Bruner solves the problem in two ways.  First, based on a lengthy analysis 
 
81. Id. at 159. 
82. See id. at 160. 
83. Id. (quoting John Clarke et al., Remaking Welfare: The British Welfare Regime in the 
1980s and 1990s, in COMPARING WELFARE STATES 71, 76 (Allan Cochrane et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2001)). 
84. Id. at 192–93. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. It seems a little puzzling that Australia toyed with the U.S. approach at all rather than 
simply adopting the U.K. approach.  Jennifer Hill has suggested that the apparent shift came as a 
result of the cases first arising in the courts, before the Takeover Panel was set up.  See, e.g., 
Jennifer G. Hill, Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate 
Governance 5–6 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 168/2010, 2010) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1704745.  For an argument that 
the mode of regulation—self-regulation in the United Kingdom, courts in the United States—has 
shaped the diverging U.S. and U.K. approaches to takeovers, see Armour & Skeel, supra note 77, 
at 1767–84. 
88. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 200. 
89. See id. at 83, 213 (discussing aspects of Canadian corporate law that make it appear more 
stakeholder friendly than it actually is). 
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of the BCE, Inc. case, Bruner contends that Canadian corporate law is far 
less stakeholder oriented in practice than it appears to be.90  Although the 
analysis veers perilously close to the domain of special pleading, Bruner’s 
conclusions seem more or less plausible.  And it is of course essential to 
consider the law as it actually functions, not simply the law on the books.  
(Indeed, I will raise precisely this kind of concern about Bruner’s 
characterization of U.S. law below.) 
Second, Bruner characterizes Canada (as well as Australia) as 
occupying a middle ground between the United States and the United 
Kingdom, with governance that is more shareholder oriented than the 
United States but not quite so shareholder-centric as the United Kingdom.91  
Although this characterization seems accurate, it also is more worrisome for 
the explanatory power of Bruner’s theory.  If the shareholder and social 
welfare relationship is a continuum rather than a clear distinction, the theory 
becomes very difficult to falsify.  Country A, which is somewhat 
shareholder oriented and has somewhat robust social welfare protections, 
and thus fits the theory, becomes hard to distinguish from Country B, which 
is somewhat shareholder oriented but has rather weak social welfare 
protections, or from Country C, which is not especially shareholder oriented 
but has fairly strong social welfare protection.  In Bruner’s defense, he does 
not put Canada in this category.  He argues that both Canada and Australia 
are considerably closer to the United Kingdom than to the United States.92  
But a theory that allows for endless gradations and lacks clear causal 
relationships may be hard to sustain, given the inevitable messiness of 
history and the theory’s reliance on only four countries as its data points. 
The absence of crisp causal connections also raises the question 
whether omitted factors might further complicate the apparent relationship 
between shareholder-centrism and social welfare.  One obvious candidate 
for consideration might be antitrust or competition law.  In a country that 
permits concentrated industries, both shareholders and employees might 
favor a shareholder-centric approach.  The United States has traditionally 
been more aggressive in enforcing competition law than the other three 
countries,93 although regulators’ easing up on antitrust enforcement in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s was one of the contributing factors to the U.S. 
takeover wave of the 1980s.94 
 
90. Bruner spends six full pages developing his explanation of BCE, Inc.  Id. at 89–95. 
91. Id. at 77, 200. 
92. Id. at 176. 
93. See id. at 154 (describing the prevailing view that “U.K. competition regulation . . . was 
‘modest’ in comparison with U.S. antitrust regulation”). 
94. George Bittlingmayer, The Antitrust Emperor’s Clothes, REGULATION, Fall 2002, at 46, 
48–49. 
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III. How Weak Are U.S. Shareholders? 
In the next Part, I will consider the possibility that the United States is 
simply an outlier, while the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada 
coherently combine social welfare and shareholder orientation.  But let me 
first raise the question whether the analysis accurately describes the United 
States and the relationship between corporate law and social welfare in this 
country. 
One question, it seems to me, is whether shareholders really are as 
weak in the United States as the Bruner thesis suggests.  Although U.S. 
shareholders lack many of the powers seen in the United Kingdom, they 
have one lever that U.K. shareholders do not: a robust right to sue.95  Due 
primarily to the generous rules for compensating plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
shareholders can much more easily sue in the United States than in the 
United Kingdom.96  From this perspective, shareholder litigation may 
supply an ex post substitute for the ex ante powers U.K. shareholders have.  
Bruner recognizes this possibility but rejects it.97  Although shareholder 
litigation may be a partial substitute, it falls far short of closing the gap.  “If 
greater capacity to sue were truly intended to substitute for strong 
shareholder governance powers,” he argues, “then we might expect to find 
similarly strong expressions of commitment to shareholders in the 
articulation of directors’ duties.”98  But to the contrary, Bruner concludes 
“the divergence between the express shareholder-centrism of the U.K. 
Companies Act and the ambivalent formulation of directors’ fiduciary 
duties in Delaware is every bit as stark as the divergence between the 
shareholders’ governance powers in the two jurisdictions.”99  
I think Bruner is right about this.  Even effective ex post remedies are 
unlikely to fully substitute for ex ante governance powers, and the efficacy 
of shareholder litigation is subject to particular doubt.100  But I am 
 
95. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical 
Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 687, 
688–90, 721–22 (2009) (testing the hypothesis that the United States is more “litigation-friendly” 
with respect to private enforcement of corporate law and concluding that the United States has a 
higher “intensity of formal private enforcement[, which] may compensate for [its] modest 
substantive protections, producing a ‘shareholder-friendly’ end result”). 
96. See, e.g., id. at 692 (“For instance, various features of civil procedure . . . are more 
favorable to plaintiffs in the United States.  In particular, the facilitation of class actions and the 
use of contingency fees stimulate entrepreneurial attorneys, whereas the United Kingdom’s ‘loser 
pays’ fees rule will discourage representative litigation.”). 
97. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 104–05. 
98. Id. at 105. 
99. Id. 
100. Bruner notes one reason for this doubt: the difficulty of determining litigation’s 
effectiveness in deterring director misbehavior.  Id. at 101–02.  The fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine—which presumes reliance if the stock in question is actively traded and which is a key 
feature of most securities litigation—is under serious attack, both in the courts and among 
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somewhat skeptical about his characterization of U.S. corporate governance 
for a different reason.  Although Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence is far 
less shareholder oriented than the United Kingdom’s, as Bruner points out 
at length,101 the directors of target corporations are now far less likely to 
resist a shareholder-benefitting takeover than they were in the early years of 
the 1980s takeover wave.102  In the 1990s, directors and managers were 
increasingly paid in stock and stock options, rather than cash, which made 
them much less likely to thumb their noses at a lucrative takeover offer.103  
During this same period, shareholders have made much more active use of 
the governance levers they do have at their disposal.  As a result, some 
commentators have argued that publicly held companies in the United 
States are run in a highly shareholder-oriented fashion.104  Delaware 
doctrine may not be shareholder oriented, the reasoning goes, but the 
behavior of Delaware corporations is. 
If this characterization is accurate, as I believe it is, one possible 
response might be to predict that this recent shareholder orientation will be 
accompanied by increasingly robust social welfare protections.  The 
obvious evidence to marshal in support of this thesis is the enactment of 
healthcare legislation in 2010,105 which Bruner mentions at several points106 
but does not really explore.  One problem with such an account is that it is 
very hard to see the causal relationship between the new shareholder-centric 
reality and the recent healthcare reform.  Perhaps this is, in part, because the 
legislation, like the Dodd-Frank reforms enacted shortly thereafter,107 and 
which Bruner does discuss,108 is still too new to put in historical 
perspective.  There is a second, very different problem as well: if the United 
 
academics.  For an important recent academic critique, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). 
101. See BRUNER, supra note 16, at 36–42. 
102. Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock were the first to draw attention to the implications of this 
development.  Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002). 
103. See id. at 896. 
104. See, e.g., id. at 899 (stating that managers have now adopted shareholder value 
maximization as their mantra).  Ed Rock has recently suggested that shareholder–manager agency 
costs may no longer be the most important issue in U.S. corporate law.  Edward B. Rock, 
Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1910 (2013).  U.S. 
corporations are run in so shareholder oriented a fashion, at least at present, that shareholder 
opportunism vis-à-vis creditors is a more relevant risk.  Id. at 1910–11. 
105. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
106. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 284–85, 290. 
107. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 26, 28, 
31, 42, and 44 U.S.C.). 
108. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 267–68, 270–72, 280–84.  As noted earlier, Bruner focuses 
primarily on several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that give new authority to shareholders.  
See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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States is shareholder-centric too, all four countries line up on the same side 
of the spectrum.  This would suggest that the diversity that motivated the 
book in the first instance is more illusory than real, although it also would 
raise the intriguing question of whether countries whose stock ownership is 
relatively dispersed will inevitably gravitate toward the shareholder-centric, 
robust social welfare side of the spectrum. 
Let me speculate for a moment about this last possibility.  The 
conventional explanation for the United Kingdom’s robust social welfare 
system is that it was spurred in important part by the devastation England 
suffered from bombing in World War II, as well as the costs of the war in 
general.109  Although Australia and Canada did not endure the same 
hardships, they were influenced by developments in the United Kingdom.110  
The United States, by contrast, charted a different course, adopting more 
limited social welfare protections and looking to employer-provided 
protections during a period when U.S. industry was dominant.111  Perhaps 
this was unsustainable, and the United States also is headed toward the 
same shareholder-centrism and robust social welfare system as Bruner 
identifies in the other three common law nations. 
IV. Is the United States Simply an Outlier? 
I suggested in the last Part that U.S. corporate law currently may be 
more shareholder-centric than shareholders’ limited formal powers suggest.  
In this Part, I will consider another possibility.  Perhaps the United States is 
simply peculiar, an odd duck.  I pursue this possibility by considering the 
impact of American federalism and the puzzling weakness of the American 
social safety net. 
A. Federalism and the Limits on Shareholder-Centrism 
The leading contemporary account of the political economy of 
American corporate law identifies federalism and American populism as 
two of the (mutually reinforcing) political reasons that managers have 
traditionally been strong and shareholders comparatively weak.112  Thanks 
to populism, financial institutions have long been prevented from actively 
controlling American corporations, both by legal prohibitions on their stock 
ownership and by strong norms against their exerting control.113  Managers 
 
109. See John Clarke et al., The Construction of the British Welfare State, 1945–1975, in 
COMPARING WELFARE STATES, supra note 83, at 29, 34–44. 
110. See BRUNER, supra note 16, at 176 (stating that the social welfare models of Australia 
and Canada resemble, “for broadly similar reasons,” that of the United Kingdom, but that the 
resemblance is due to a unique set of factors). 
111. See id. at 166–76. 
112. See ROE, supra note 4, at x. 
113. Id. at 48–49. 
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have been an important beneficiary of this straitjacket.114  States’ efforts to 
attract corporate business has further strengthened managers’ hands, since 
managers tend to decide where companies incorporate and where they open 
a new plant.115  Both sides in the endless (and now thankfully waning) 
debate over whether Delaware’s dominant share of incorporations reflects a 
race to the top or a race to the bottom agree that Delaware is acutely 
sensitive to managers’ interests, disagreeing primarily about whether 
managers’ interests are aligned with those of shareholders’.116 
One thing Delaware does not have is any particular reason to show 
concern for employees and the robustness of the social welfare system.  
Very few corporations have a significant number of employees in 
Delaware, since their headquarters and significant assets are elsewhere.117  
By contrast, nearly 20% of Delaware’s annual income depends on the state 
continuing to keep the managers and/or shareholders of its corporations 
happy.118  Delaware’s resolution of most corporate governance issues—
including takeovers, in stark contrast to both the United Kingdom and 
Australia—through common law judicial decision making also tends to 
favor the interests of managers.119 
This does not refute the Brunerian thesis, of course.  Even if Delaware 
does not have any particular interest in employees, it may nevertheless face 
pressure to take their interests into account.  When the Delaware Supreme 
Court shifted from a relatively proshareholder approach to hostile takeovers 
(though still much less proshareholder than the United Kingdom) to a much 
more manager-oriented standard in 1989,120 some commentators suggest 
that it is possible to attribute the shift to concerns that Congress might enact 
 
114. See id. at 5 (describing the rise of “professional managers”). 
115. This feature has been discussed more by sociologists than by corporate law scholars.  
See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the 
Formation of the American Welfare State, 30 POL. & SOC’Y 277, 290 (2002) (discussing concerns 
amongst state social policy reformers that reform efforts would discourage business development). 
116. For the founding articles in this debate, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, 
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).  See 
also Armour & Skeel, supra note 77, at 1765. 
117. Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 136 (2004). 
118. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6–8 (1993) 
(noting that up to 17.7% of Delaware’s total tax revenue comes from franchise taxes and noting 
that this number is very high compared to other states). 
119. For a much more detailed analysis of this point in the takeover context, see Armour & 
Skeel, supra note 77, at 1780–84. 
120. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989) 
(deferring to Paramount’s managers’ decision not to accept Time’s offer because the offer was 
reasonably perceived by Paramount’s board as a threat). 
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legislation discouraging takeovers, thus intruding on Delaware’s turf.121  
Employees and their representatives were one of the groups urging 
congressional action.122  If Delaware’s shift was an effort to blunt the 
campaign for federal intervention by rendering it unnecessary, employees 
may thus have contributed indirectly to the Delaware ruling.  Roe has 
offered a similar analytic on Delaware–Washington interaction: Delaware 
has limited reason to promote employee and other social welfare interests in 
the corporation, as it is boards and shareholders who decide whether to 
incorporate in Delaware.123  If American corporate law were fully made in 
Washington, stakeholder interests would be more prominently involved.124  
Shareholders could put up with a Delaware tilt to managers (and an 
occasional venting of stakeholder interests), as the results for shareholders 
if corporate law were made in Washington might not be to their liking.125  
Although Delaware’s comparative disinterest in employees does not 
undermine Bruner’s thesis, it does suggest that managers, whom Delaware 
clearly does attend to,126 should be a central part of any story about 
American corporate law.  Managers with authority may do a little extra for 
employees.  The most obvious explanation for the manager-centrism of 
American corporate law, as compared to the United Kingdom’s shareholder 
orientation, is American federalism.  More nuanced historical factors, such 
as the contractual and self-regulatory traditions of U.K. corporate law and 
the more direct governmental role in the life of corporations in the United 
States may also have played a part.127  Whatever the mix of factors, 
managers lie at the heart of corporate law in the United States but not in the 
United Kingdom.  The general weakness of shareholder rights seems more 
closely related to managerial influence than to the limitations of the U.S. 
social welfare system.  That is, Bruner’s thesis needs to explain why 
American managerialism leads to both weaker shareholder power (than the 
United Kingdom) and some managerial noblesse oblige, in that the 
managers at times do things that are in employees’ interest.  Or, more 
subtly, perhaps managers, to maintain their authority in the firm over the 
long run, need to have political and social allies, such as employees and 
stakeholders. 
 
121. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 
1964–66 (1991) (explaining the argument that Delaware courts might have taken into 
consideration possible congressional action in making their ruling). 
122. See id. at 1965. 
123. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2500–02 (2005). 
124. Id. at 2502–04. 
125. See id. at 2515–16. 
126. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
127. See, e.g., Armour & Skeel, supra note 77, at 1767–84 (describing the importance of self-
regulation to differences in U.S. and U.K. takeover law). 
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As astute an observer as he is, Bruner is well aware of this.  In the final 
major chapter of the book, he increasingly relies on coalition theory—
which posits that corporate governance is shaped by shifting coalitions of 
employees, managers, and shareholders128—to assess recent developments 
such as the U.K. government’s retrenchment on social welfare protections 
and the United States’ augmenting of social welfare through healthcare 
reform and inclusion of shareholder-oriented provisions in the Dodd-Frank 
Act.129  This has the benefit of making managers a much more central factor 
in the story, but it complicates Bruner’s own core story about social welfare 
and shareholder power as the key features of corporate governance, with the 
structure of the former being the primary determinant of the latter. 
B. Why Is the U.S. Safety Net So Weak? 
Perhaps the real puzzle is not why or whether the United States is so 
much less shareholder oriented than the other three common law countries.  
Perhaps the real puzzle is America’s social safety net.  Developed non-
common law countries tend to have extremely robust social safety nets (in 
some cases probably too well developed, but that is another story).130  
Although the social safety nets have been somewhat more contested in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, each has much more protection 
than the United States.131  From this perspective, the most puzzling feature 
of the social welfare–shareholder centrism equation is the weakness of the 
U.S. social welfare system.  Why is the U.S. safety net so much weaker 
than everyone else’s? 
Although social welfare experts would offer a more nuanced account, 
four distinctively American factors seem to me to figure in the contrast 
between the United States and other common law countries.  The first is the 
federalism concerns I noted in the previous subpart.  The ability for 
businesses to move out of states that require generous provisions for 
employees, or impose other costs, acts as a constraint on states’ abilities to 
provide generous benefits.  Given states’ interests in local control, this 
factor may also translate to some extent to limits on federal programs.   
 
128. BRUNER, supra note 16, at 130–31. 
129. See id. at 265–67 (discussing coalitions and their effect on the post-crisis reform efforts 
and concluding that some reforms that would shift power to shareholders did make it into the 
Dodd-Frank Act); id. at 280–84 (noting that shifting dynamics have tended to promote greater 
social welfare protection (such as the health care law) in the United States); id. at 286 (noting the 
diverging postcrisis response in the United Kingdom, which has weakened stakeholder’s 
interests). 
130. See, e.g., Liz Alderman, Why Denmark Is Shrinking Its Social Safety Net, ECONOMIX, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2010, 12:12 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/why-
denmark-is-shrinking-its-social-safety-net/ (discussing Denmark’s “expensive, generous welfare 
state” and why it is shrinking). 
131. See BRUNER, supra note 16, at 143. 
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The second is race.132  The American experience with slavery and Jim 
Crow segregation complicates the politics of American social welfare in 
ways that sharply distinguish the United States from the other three 
countries under consideration.  The most obvious beneficiaries of many 
forms of welfare legislation in the twentieth century would have been poor 
whites and poor blacks.  Yet the racial divisions of the Jim Crow era and 
after made it nearly impossible to create a coalition consisting of both poor 
whites and poor blacks.  This has created a very different politics of welfare 
legislation than is the norm in the United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia. 
The third factor is ideological.  The ideology of self-reliance that was 
once associated with the American Frontier has a stronger pull in the United 
States than elsewhere—especially as compared to European countries.  This 
is reflected in the insistence that Americans who receive welfare benefits 
work for those benefits.133  Although legal scholars periodically insist that 
every American should be entitled to a minimum level of income,134 this 
contention has never seemed compelling to most Americans.135 
The final factor is related to the third.  America’s bankruptcy discharge 
is considerably more generous than the discharge in most other countries, 
including the other common law countries.  In the United States, a 
financially troubled consumer debtor nearly always has access to an 
immediate discharge of her debts based on the premise that both the debtor 
and her creditors are better off if an “honest but unfortunate”136 debtor 
sheds her debts and is given a second chance.137  In the United Kingdom, by 
contrast, debtors often receive a less generous discharge, and sometimes no 
discharge at all.138  The American approach does less to discourage 
excessive borrowing, but it also appears to facilitate entrepreneurship, since 
an entrepreneur is not saddled by the obligations of a failed initial 
venture.139  More importantly, it also serves as a partial proxy for the social 
 
132. Thanks go to Mark Roe for encouraging me to consider the implications of race. 
133. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 24–27 (2000). 
134. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 21–44 (1999) 
(proposing that every citizen be given a sum of money when they reach maturity). 
135. Dylan Matthews, Obama Doesn’t Want to Just Write Welfare Recipients Checks. But 
What If We Did?, WONKBLOG, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/08/08/obama-doesnt-want-to-just-write-welfare-recipients-
checks-but-what-if-we-did/ (describing the idea of a universal basic income as unpopular). 
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welfare benefits that are not available in the United States and accords with 
the ideological commitment to self-reliance rather than governmental 
support for those who are struggling. 
The key question with the American preference for bankruptcy rather 
than robust social welfare protections is whether it is likely to endure, or 
whether the United States will eventually fall more closely in line with 
other developed nations.  Predicting is always hazardous, but my guess is 
that the distinctions will remain.  To be sure, a partial convergence may be 
underway, with Western Europeans retrenching somewhat on issues like the 
length of the workweek and age of retirement,140 while the United States 
has added universal healthcare.  But the structural and political factors that 
distinguish the United States from other common law countries, and from 
continental Europe, have not disappeared. 
The Brunerian thesis easily accommodates these observations.  If the 
American social welfare system remains weaker than that of other 
countries, the thesis would predict that shareholder powers will remain 
more limited in the United States.  But the fit seems imperfect in at least 
two respects.  First, as discussed earlier, U.S. governance appears to be 
much more shareholder oriented in practice than seems the case if we only 
consider Delaware doctrine.  This shareholder-centrism seems real, and it 
does not seem connected in any discernible way with the recent, still greatly 
contested expansion of the U.S. social welfare system. 
Second, Delaware corporate law has long oscillated between an 
emphasis on shareholders’ interests, on the one hand, and a less 
shareholder-oriented emphasis on the corporate entity as a whole, on the 
other.141  If shareholder-centrism is tightly linked to the strength of a 
country’s social welfare system, we might expect to see some connection 
between these oscillations and changes in the social welfare system.  But 
there do not seem to be any evident connections between the two. 
Conclusion 
Over the past several months, I have described the Brunerian thesis to 
a wide range of corporate law scholars—most from the United States, but 
some from the other common law countries as well—and asked them 
whether they find the thesis persuasive.  Nearly every one has given one of 
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two responses, at least initially.  Some explain why the thesis cannot be 
correct, and the others conclude that its insights are obvious.  The reactions 
sound suspiciously similar to a definition I once heard of a successful 
scholarly presentation.  The best papers and presentations, I was told, are 
the ones in which the audience is initially convinced that the scholar’s 
thesis is completely wrong, and eventually concludes that it is obvious. 
Bruner’s claim that strongly shareholder-oriented governance—which 
sniffs of Wall Street rather than Main Street—is associated with robust 
social welfare protections—which sounds much more like Main Street—is 
both counterintuitive and plausible.  Even if Bruner had not marshaled 
extensive supporting evidence, it would be a thesis that corporate law 
scholars, and perhaps social welfare experts as well, would need to grapple 
with.  The elaborately detailed case that Bruner presents adds to its 
importance. 
As my quibbles suggest, I am not sure whether Bruner is right.  The 
mechanism that links the two halves of the thesis together is somewhat 
unclear, with connections that are more indirect than direct.  But there is an 
undeniable logic to his thesis, and I do not believe that the connections he 
identifies are imaginary.  Any future scholar who purports to provide an 
explanation of comparative corporate governance will need to consider how 
social welfare legislation may be shaping what he or she sees in the 
corporate governance of a particular country.  It is hard to imagine a more 
compelling demonstration that U.S. corporate law scholars need not only to 
continue looking outside the United States but also to venture beyond the 
narrow confines of corporate law. 
 
 
